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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-2450 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
HAROLD PALMER, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 10-312-01) 
 District Judge:  Hon. Berle M. Schiller 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 15, 2012 
 
Before:  SMITH, FISHER, and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 16, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 After a jury trial, appellant Harold Palmer was convicted of extortion under color 
of official right and making a false statement to a federal agent.  He was sentenced to 18 
months‟ incarceration, a period of supervised release, and a special assessment.  Palmer 
now appeals, challenging his sentence as procedurally unreasonable.  We hold that the 
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District Court committed no error at Palmer‟s sentencing.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
Palmer‟s sentence. 
I.   
 
 We write principally for the benefit of the parties and recite only the facts essential 
to our disposition. 
 Prior to March 2010, Palmer participated in a Department of Homeland Security 
investigation of Saman Salem, an individual with whom he was acquainted.  Salem 
operated an illegal business where he collected money in exchange for assisting 
individuals with obtaining fraudulent driver‟s licenses and other documents from the 
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.   
 Palmer worked as a driver‟s license examiner, and Salem paid him to assist in 
obtaining these documents.  In the course of that investigation, Palmer gave statements to 
various investigating officials and agreed to wear a microphone in order to electronically 
record conversations with Salem.   
 In March 2010, Palmer ended his cooperation with the investigation.  On March 
15, 2010, after ending his cooperation, Palmer was arrested on a warrant and charged 
with extortion under color of official right, making a false statement to a federal agent, 
and conspiracy to illegally produce Pennsylvania driver‟s licenses. 
 A four day jury trial followed, at which Palmer was acquitted of the conspiracy 
charge and convicted of the remaining charges on December 8, 2010.  Palmer did not file 
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any post-trial motions.
1
  The federal sentencing guidelines details an undisputed advisory 
range of 33 to 41 months for Palmer‟s convictions.  On May 19, 2011, the District Court 
held a sentencing proceeding to determine Palmer‟s sentence.   
 Palmer‟s counsel presented various responses to some of the claims the 
government had made in its sentencing memorandum.  At one point, when Palmer‟s 
counsel was discussing the amount of money Salem allegedly paid Palmer, she 
acknowledged that her present line of argument was “probably not my primary 
argument,” the District Court inquired, “[w]hat is your primary argument?”  Palmer‟s 
counsel replied by responding to different claims in the government‟s memorandum.  The 
District Court judge allowed her to continue in that vein for some time before asking, 
“[w]hat is your proposal for me?”  Palmer‟s counsel responded by continuing to address 
various claims in the government‟s memorandum.  The District Court judge then 
interrupted her for a third time, asking, “[w]hat do you want me to do?”  Palmer‟s 
counsel responded “I want you to put him on probation, Judge,” whereafter the District 
Court judge thanked counsel for her argument and directed her to sit.  The District Court 
judge then discussed the appropriate sentence with counsel for the government. 
 At the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, Palmer was sentenced to eighteen 
months‟ incarceration for each conviction, to be served concurrently, followed by three 
years of supervised release to be served concurrently on each count and was ordered to 
pay a special assessment of $200.  Palmer timely appealed his sentence. 
II. 
                                              
1
 Palmer does not challenge either conviction on the present appeal. 
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We have jurisdiction over Palmer‟s appeal of his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  Although procedural errors at sentencing are generally 
subject to review for abuse of discretion, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 
(2007), when the error is not raised before the District Court, our review is for plain error.  
United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2006).   
Palmer does not claim that he raised any objection to the alleged error before the 
District Court, and we therefore review his claim only for plain error.  To satisfy the plain 
error standard, the error below must affect substantial rights and must be “„clear‟ or 
„obvious.‟  In most cases, an error affects substantial rights if it is prejudicial. . .  When 
such an error exists, [we] have the authority to order correction, but [are] not required to 
do so.  We will exercise our discretion and vacate the sentence if the plain error affecting 
substantial rights also seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
III. 
 Palmer raises a single claim on appeal.  Specifically, he claims that the trial court 
committed reversible error in not allowing his counsel to finish her intended presentation 
at his sentencing.  Palmer‟s contention amounts to an argument that his sentence was 
procedurally unreasonable because his counsel‟s truncated presentation prevented the 
District Court from being able to consider all of the necessary 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 
in setting his sentence.   
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 For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “the sentencing court must give 
rational and meaningful consideration to the relevant § 3553(a) factors.”  United States v. 
Young, 634 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).  Further, a sentence 
is procedurally unreasonable if the sentencing authority fails “to adequately explain the 
chosen sentence - including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.”  
Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A) provides that before the 
imposition of a sentence, the District Court must: 1) provide the defendant‟s counsel with 
an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant; 2) address the defendant personally 
and give the defendant the chance to speak if he desires to do so; and 3) provide the 
government with an equal opportunity to speak as that which the court provided to the 
defendant‟s counsel.  Palmer claims that the District Court failed to provide his counsel 
with adequate opportunity to speak on his behalf as required by this Rule, and that in so 
doing, did not allow his counsel “to comment on matters relating to an appropriate 
sentence.”  Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 715 (2008) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(i)(1)(C)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We cannot agree. 
 Although the District Court undeniably shortened the argument of Palmer‟s 
counsel, that fact alone does not constitute procedural error.  As this Court has previously 
articulated, a defendant is entitled to his counsel having a “meaningful opportunity” to 
comment on matters relevant to sentencing.  See United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 
764 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing the opportunity defense counsel must be given to 
comment on a presentence report). 
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 In the present case, as the exchange between the District Court and Palmer‟s 
counsel makes clear, the District Court indicated that it had heard sufficient argument on 
whatever factors it considered to be relevant to Palmer‟s sentence.  Palmer has not 
alleged that the District Court relied on any impermissible factors or any erroneous 
factual conclusions, he has merely asserted that the District Court might have done so.  
Palmer has, however, claimed that the District Court never heard about Palmer‟s own 
history and character, which it was required to consider under § 3553(a).  Because this is 
the only specific error he alleges in his brief, his claim is wholly dependent on his claim 
that there was no argument made relating to evidence of his character and history. 
 In addition to his counsel‟s argument at the sentencing hearing, Palmer introduced 
the testimony of two family witnesses who testified to his personal qualities, and Palmer 
himself offered allocution of his good character to the District Court.  In light of this 
substantial evidence of Palmer‟s history and character, we cannot conclude that the 
District Court did not properly consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  We note that 
Palmer has not specifically articulated a single additional point he believes the District 
Court judge was precluded from hearing.  We therefore conclude that between the 
argument of Palmer‟s counsel, his witnesses, and his own allocution, the District Court 
judge had all of the information he needed when he ended argument by Palmer‟s counsel.  
We hold that the District Court did not err in its sentencing colloquy with Palmer‟s 
counsel. 
IV. 
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 Because we conclude that the District Court did not commit procedural error at 
Palmer‟s sentencing, we will affirm the District Court‟s sentence. 
